![]() ![]() Coherence and Truth 157 The problem: justification and truth 157 Realism and the correspondence theory of truth The metajustificatory argument 169 Skeptical hypotheses 179 APPENDIX A. Answers to Objections 139 Answers to standard objections (I) and (II) 1}9 Some further objections 146 A restatement of the coherentist account 15} 8.Coherence and Observation 87 89 I I I An initial objection I I 2 A suggestion from Sellars I 14 Coherentist observation: an example II7 The justification of the premises 124 Introspection 1}2 7 The Elements of Coherentism 87 The very idea of a coherence theory Linear versus nonlinear justification The concept of coherence 93 The Doxastic Presumption IOI The standard objections I06 6. hlllk Oil IIII' (o//ndation of knowledge 61 Vllillloll'S conception of empirical intuition 65 I.cwis Oil the given 72 All appeal to the a priori 79 PART TWO Toward a Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge 5. Thl' I )(H trilll' III the ElIlpirically Given 58 Ih.' Id"" 01 lin' gil'clI )8. Externalist Versions of Foundationalism The basic idea of externalism 34 Some counter-examples to Armstrong's view A basic objection to externalism 4 I Some externalist rejoinders 46 Arguments in favor of externalism 52 34 37 Vll ,I. Foundationalism: The Main Conception 16 The epistemic regress problem I7 The varieties of foundationalism 26 A basic problem for foundationalism 30 3. Knowledge and Justification 3 The traditional conception of knowledge 3 The concept of epistemic justification 5 The epistemological task 8 2. ![]() ![]() Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason Contents Preface Xl PART ONE A Critique of Empirical Foundationalism 1. For if, in respect of this law also, I have nothing but opinion, it is all merely a play of the imagination, without the least relation to truth. Moreover, the law of such a connection must be certain. paper) (cloth) ISBN 1-1 (paper) I must never presume to opine, without knowing at least something by means of which the judgment, in itself merely problematic, secures connection with truth, a connection which, although not complete, is yet more than arbitrary fiction. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge LAURENCE BONJOUR Harvard University Press CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, AND LONDON, ENGLAND Copyright © 1985 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Bonjour, Laurence, 1943The structure of empirical knowledge. ![]()
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